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I INTRODUCTION 
f"W~ l!HR.fH OF 
!')Ef~MA,-fOt,J LIT 1!,ATtON 
The use of humour to comment on current events and on the views and 
actions of other members of society, is a device employed by many 
individuals, including newspaper columnists, cartoonists, entertainers, 
playwrights, politicians and talkback hosts. Humour provides the 
opportunity for a unique perspective to be taken on issues as it combines 
laughter with information and criticism, thus contributing to a better 
informed and more diverse society. 2 However as the above cartoon 
illustrates not all humorous commentary is met with a warm response and 
as some defendants have learned to their financial detriment, a sense of 
humour or, worse still, a joke, often finds no favours in the courts. 3 
Defamation actions for unwelcome humour are based upon Baron Parke's 
classic definition of defamation in Parmiter v Coupland' where his 
honour held " A publication without justification or lawful excuse which 
is calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule is a libel" (emphasis added). Of course it was not 
intended that all ridicule should be enough to support a defamation action, 
otherwise every newspaper, magazine, ( especially those that specialise in 
1 Cartoon republished with the permission of Andrew Weldon, (freelance cartoonist and contributor to 
Walker Online Magazine <http ://magazine.walkleys.com> ). 
2 Tony Fitzgerald J "Telling the Truth, Laughing" (13 November 1998) Communications Update 
Sydney 11 , 14. 
3 Duncan Lamont "Let the Judges do the Jokes" (9 June 2003) The Guardian London. 
4 Parmiter v Coupland ( 1840) 6 M & W 105, 108 per Baron Parke. 
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humorous commentary) would find themselves perpetually subject to 
actions being brought against them. 5 As Learned-Hand, J recognised "a 
man must not be too thin-skinned or a self-important prig ... a line must be 
drawn" and "statements which any reasonable person would be able to 
laugh off should not be defamatory". 6 
Unfortunately this line has proven to be somewhat of a legal enigma and 
there is a great disparity with regards to when a comment made in jest 
becomes actionable. 7 This inconsistency has led to a call for reform in this 
sub-section of the law, with the honourable Tony Fitzgerald stating that 
currently "humour is extremely vulnerable, and numerous publications, 
broadcast and print, involve [ an unacceptable] degree of legal risk ... the 
law needs to develop sophisticated responses which do not unduly inhibit 
the message which readers and listeners have the ability and wit to 
comprehend". 8 
This paper analyses the problems facing humour when it encounters 
defamation law and attempts to formulate possible resolutions to these 
issues. Part II looks at the disparity that has arisen in judicial decisions in 
this area, while Part III looks at the changing societal attitudes towards 
humour and its relationship with the right to free speech. Finally Part IV 
reviews the possible options of reform concluding that the appropriate 
answer is through an amendment to the Defamation Act 1992, which 
would make humour a protected form of free speech. The potential scope 
of this submission is also canvassed. 
II THE NEED FOR REFORM: PROBLEMATIC JUDICIAL 
APPLICATION 
5 Odger v Mortimer ( I 873) 28 LT 472,473 per Bovil CJ. 
6 Burton v Crowell Publishing Co (1936) 82 F 2d 154 per Learned-Hand J. 
7 Paul Satouris "The Role of Media Satire in Australia and its Relation to Defamation Law" (2002) 21 
Communications Bulletin 3. 
8 Tony Fitzgerald J "Telling the Truth, Laughing " ( 13 ovember 1998) Communications Update 
Sydney 11 , 16. 
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Generally speaking, the law recognises that all persons are entitled to their 
good name and to the esteem in which they are held by others. 
Defamation is the area of the law that seeks to protect ones reputation 
from being injured by unjustifiable attacks. Although codified in the 
Defamation Act 1992, the area still remains very much a common law 
subject.9 Essentially for an action to succeed the following elements must 
be present: 
• A statement published to a third party 
• The statement was defamatory of the plaintiff 
• No justifiable excuse exists for making the statement 
Although these factors appear straightforward, a significant amount of 
complexity and subtlety is involved when applying them to cases 
involving humorous remarks. '0 This section highlights the difficulty that 
has been encountered by the judiciary and the inconsistent and at times 
erroneous judgements that have resulted. 
It is pertinent to note at this stage, that this is an area of the law that still 
remains largely unexamined, if one is to look in the index of most 
defamation textbooks, terms such as humour or satire will not appear. 
Additionally satire, parody, cartoons and other forms of humorous 
commentary have been the subject of very few defamation actions. There 
are numerous possible reasons for this, including the complexity and cost 
involved in any defamation action, the realisation that litigation will bring 
more attention to an already embarrassing situation and the assumption 
that statements made in jest would infrequently be capable of being found 
defamatory. Whatever the reason the fact remains that there is a 
substantial lack of depth in case Jaw or academic commentary within this 
9 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media La w in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1999) 11. 
10 Tony Fitzgerald J "Telling the Truth, Laughing " ( 13 November 1998) Communications Update 
Sydney 11 , 16. 
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area, subsequently this section therefore draws on a number of foreign 
cases in order to achieve a more comprehensive analysis. 11 
A Defamatory Matter 
The first half of any defamation action involves the court determining 
whether the statement made was one that is actionable. This involves a 
two-step procedure where the courts must first determine what the words 
are capable of meaning (i.e. what imputations arise from the allegedly 
defamatory matter) before determining whether or not that meaning could 
be held to be defamatory. If this criteria is answered in the affirmative the 
matter is then passed to the jury to determine whether or not the statement 
was in fact defamatory. 
In determining these criteria, the court will have regard to the views of 
that cornerstone of tort law; the hypothetical reasonable person. For the 
purposes of defamation law the reasonable person as been defined as "a 
person of ordinary intelligence, general knowledge and experience of 
worldly affairs". 12 The court will thus consider, under the circumstances 
in which the words were published, what would the ordinary and 
reasonable person understand them to mean and additionally would they 
be likely to regard them in a libellous sense. 13 
It is however universally accepted that the court in undertaking the 
assessment is not solely limited to the literal meaning of the statements, 
the court must consider the publication as a whole, as it is recognised that 
the reasonable person can and does read between the lines. 14 
Consequently the context of a publication may be of fundamental 
11 As noted by the authors of Gatley on Libel and Slander 9th ed. (Sweet and Maxwell: London 1998) 
although some variations exist between the law of the different countries, especially the USA where 
there is vigorous recognition of the first amendment right to free speech1 the principles of defamation 
law (in particular what constitutes a defamatory matter) remain sufficiently similar so that foreign 
decisions may be usefully cited. 
12 New Zealand Magazines v Hadlee (24 October 1996) Court of Appeal CA 74/96 Blanchard J. 
13 Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v Henty ( 1882) 7 App Cas 741 . 
14 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234. 
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importance as the meaning attributed to the words and the potential to 
defame will be coloured by their surroundings. 15 
Given the rules canvassed above, one could be forgiven for assuming that 
satire and other humorous commentary would be immune from successful 
defamation claims, as the reasonable person when reading such material 
would be competent enough to observe that piece was written or said in 
such an exaggerated or hyperbolic style, 16 such that any defamatory 
imputation could not seriously be said to arise. 
Generally it would seem that the courts have accepted this viewpoint as 
valid. The case of Massey v The New Zealand Times 17 concerned a 
cartoon published by the newspaper defendant, which depicted a cart 
labelled "The Party" being hitched to a donkey, by a figure bearing the 
words "their idea of a politician". On top of the cart were various bundles 
branded with statements such as "Defamation", "Mud", "Pamphlets Free", 
"Private Calumny", as well as a figure of an old woman whose dress was 
inscribed with the phrase "Scandal Mongering". The plaintiff claimed that 
the cartoon imputed to him that he was responsible for, or was connected 
with the free distribution of a scurrilous pamphlet and was thus guilty of a 
mean and despicable act. Although it was found that the figure 
represented the plaintiff William Massey, the cartoon was said to simply 
be a political cartoon lampooning the party and its views and thus the 
claimed libel did not seriously arise and was not actionable. 
This approach can be seen to have also been adopted in a number of other 
cases, with one of the most recent and perhaps most famous being that of 
Falwell v Flynt. 18 In thi s case the publisher produced a cartoon, which 
represented the controversial Reverend Falwell engaged in sexual 
relations with his mother in the family outhouse. The claim for defamation 
was rejected as, for among other things, it was held that the matter 
15 Chaires /on v Newspaper Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65 (HL). 
16 Willis v Katavich (2 1 August 1989) High Court Auckland CP 547/85 Henry J. 
17 Massey v The New Zealand Times ( 1911 ) 30 NZLR 929 (SC). 
18 Falwell v Flynt 805 F.2d 484. 
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complained of was so over the top that it could not be said to have 
seriously arisen. 
While this line of authority is logical, it creates an unsatisfactory situation 
where more subtle and intelligent forms of humour are vulnerable to 
litigation. The law clearly should provide protection for those who are 
capable of intelligent and subtle humour as those who produce offensive 
and outlandish farce. It would seem that when it comes to humour, the 
courts do not think all that highly of the reasonable person ' s intelligence. 
The recent case of New Times Inc. (Dallas Observer) v Bruce Issacks and 
Darlene Whitten 19 demonstrates such a disparaging approach. 
Issacks concerned the publication of an article titled "Stop the Madness " 
in an edition of the Dallas Observer newspaper. The article was written as 
a critical response to the involvement of Justice Whitten and Deputy 
Attorney Issacks in the decision to incarcerate a 13 year old boy for 
writing a fictional horror story, in which the death of his teacher and two 
class mates was depicted. 
The article parodied this situation by portraying a similar event happening 
to a 6-year-old girl (named Cindy) for reading, "Wh ere The Wild Things 
Are" to her class. The article was written in a news report format and 
included apparent quotes from the judicial officers involved. The Dallas 
Observer was of the opinion that the article was one of competent fictional 
satire, the following exerts would support this conclusion: 
Sources say that courthouse officials ordered shackles after they reviewed 
Cindy's school discip/ina,y record, which included reprimands fo r 
spraying a boy with p ineapple juice and fo r sitting on her feet. 
Cindy scoffed at the suggestion that 'Where Th e Wild Things Are' was 
capable of corrupting young minds "Like I'm sure" she said "Its bad 
enough people think Sal/inger and Twain are dangerous but Sedank? Give 
me a break fo r Christ 's sake. Excuse my French ". 
19 New Tim es fn c (Dallas Observe,) v Bruce Issacks and Darlene Whitten (2002) 9 1 SW.3d 844 (Tex App). 
6 
However a number of people missed the joke and the judicial officials 
received a number of complaints as to their treatment of Cindy, prompting 
the officials to enter a defamation suit against the paper. Unfortunately the 
Texas courts also failed to see the humour involved, holding that the 
public misconception was evidence that the article was capable of being 
defamatory. 
While one can understand the reasoning involved it is questionable 
whether this is the right decision. Although there was evidence that the 
article misled a number of people, this does not automatically mean that 
this view was one that was reasonable, for example a number of people 
still insist on driving after they have been drinking, but we would hardly 
call these the actions of reasonable people. In fact such a finding paints a 
very dim view of the reasonable persons ability to distinguish between 
fact and fiction. 
Furthermore a court when determining whether or not a statement 1s 
defamatory is required to determine an imaginary consensus of 
hypothetical people, in doing so the court has been seen to alternate 
between a realist approach (where they consider what people actually 
thought) and an idealist approach (where they consider what people 
should have thought)2° depending upon which outcome seems more just. 
It is my submission that in cases involving humour the court should lean 
more towards an idealist approach and thus be entitled to impute a 
reasonably high standard of analytical ability into the hypothetical 
audience. In my mind the potential damage to reputation that such an 
approach may allow is outweighed by the chilling effect the opposite 
approach may have on humorous commentary.21 
20 This approach is most often seen in cases where courts think it would be unjust to perpetuate 
inappropriate prejudices. 
21 For further justifications and a more comprehensive discussion of the benefits and detriments of 
pennitting unfettered commentary, see Part III of this paper. 
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Also as the Court in Issacks noted, when dealing with cases that involve 
humour considerable regard should be had to the context of the 
publication, including whether the article is in a renowned satirical 
magazine or humour section of the newspaper. The court noted the 
decision of Bay Guardian v Superior Court22 where a fictionalised letter 
to the editor in a satirical April Fools Day edition of the paper could not 
be defamatory as the average reader would recognize the April Fool's 
edition as a parody, rather than presenting false facts. The totality of 
circumstances approach is clearly of significant importance in humour 
cases, as it significantly colours the meaning that attaches to what will 
often otherwise be a defamatory statement. To use a more classical 
phrase, the nature of the publication provides the antidote to the 
statements bane.23 
However it is my submission that the context of a publication is not 
always accorded its proper weight by the courts, the case of Keith v 
Television New Zealand24 is arguably one such decision. The plaintiff in 
this case was the Chairman of the New Zealand National Art Gallery who 
claimed he had been defamed by a segment of the satirical sketch show 
"More Issues". The disputed segment emanated from what was at the time 
a recent purchase made by the National Art Gallery of two Goldie 
paintings for $900,000. The controversial purchase was consequently the 
subject of substantial media comment and discussion, not all of which was 
favourable towards the plaintiff. The More Issues show portrayed an 
interview with a fictitious character called 'Beamish Teeth' (which it was 
held represented Mr Keith). During the segment references were made 
about the character receiving a commission from the purchase, which Mr 
Keith argued implied he was dishonestly motivated in the purchase of the 
Goldie paintings. 
22 San Francisco Bay Guardian Inc v Superior Court 21 Cal Rptr. 2d 464. 
23 Chaires ton v Newspaper Ltd [ 1995] 2 AC 65 (HL). 
24 Keith v TVNZ (December I 992) High CoLUi Auckland CP780/9 l, Robertson J. 
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In finding that this matter was defamatory both the judge and jury seem to 
have given insufficient regard to the nature of the humorous nature of the 
show. 25 In his judgement of 3 December 1992, Robertson J stated that to 
him "this was a classical example of not wanting the facts to get in the 
way of a good story". 26 This assertion, as will be discussed below,27 
misses the point behind humour in particular satire, and evidences a lack 
of proper consideration of the comedic character of the show. While often 
based upon reality the purpose of most forms of humorous commentary is 
to lampoon and critique the actual event through exaggeration and 
overstatement. Additionally the "More Issues" show was not a novel 
programme at the time the decision was made, therefore the reasonable 
viewer would have been well acquainted with the concept and purpose of 
such shows. It is thus tenable that the reasonable person would have been 
able to realise that statements were made only in jest and were not 
supposed to be taken seriously. 
Finally a discussion of judicial misconception when dealing with humour 
would not be complete without reference to the case of Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation v Hanson. 28 This case illustrates that even over 
the top humour may not be immune from successful defamation actions 
and shows how far wrong courts can go with a lack of appropriate and 
consistent regulation in this area of law. The complainant was the 
controversial Australian MP Pauline Hanson, the former parliamentarian 
had taken exception to a song created by artist Simon Hunt (aka Pauline 
Pantsdown) entitled "(I'm a) Back Door Man". 
25 However it should be noted that only ¾ of the jury thought the matter could be defamatory and given 
their nominal recommendation as to damages, it could be argued that even those in the majority were 
unsure whether the matter had caused Mr Keith to be lowered in the estimation of the public and was 
really defamatory or not. 
26 Keith v TVNZ (December 1992) High Court Auckland CP780/91, 8 Robertson J. 
27 See the discussion of the case in relation to the defence of honest opinion. 
28 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Hanson (28 September 1998) Queensland Court of Appeal BC9805224. 
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The song consisted of words spoken by Ms Hanson, which had been 
digitally sampled, re-arranged and set to a funky rhythm for humorous 
effect. 29 The cut and paste lyrics included lines such as the following: 
I'm a backdoor man; I'm a homosexual. 
I still work it, I worked the other night. 
I'm a backdoor man for the Ku Klux Klan. 
As long as children come across. I'm a happy person. 
I'm a very caring potato. 
Ms Hanson contended that such lyrics would convey to the reasonable 
listener the insinuation that she was a homosexual, prostitute, a member of 
the KKK, a paedophile, as well as a potato. The Queensland Court of 
Appeal seemed to largely share this view. Their honours were of the 
opinion that "at least one or more of [the] imputations [pleaded by the 
plaintiff] arose", 30 and that if a jury were to find the opposite they were 
satisfied that "this court would on appeal set aside its verdict as 
unreasonable". 31 Thus not only could the imputations arise, but they were 
thought to be the only ones open to a reasonable person to find. 
While the intention of the author is generally an irrelevant consideration 
in a defamation case, it has been accepted that sometimes the perceived 
intention of the author may be sufficiently obvious so as to colour the 
meaning the reasonable person attaches to the matter. 32 After listening to 
the song myself, it seems clear that the song was intended as a piece of 
29 Roger Magnusson "Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: Ridicule, Satire and Other 
Challenges" (200 l) 9 TLJ LEXIS 9, 31. 
30 The imputations that their honours found sufficiently present were that Ms Hanson was a 
homosexual man, a paedophile and a prostitute. 
31 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Hanson (28 September 1998) Queensland Court of Appeal 
BC9805224 per De Jersey CJ. 
32 Berkoffv Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008, 1018 per eil LJ. 
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political satire, to deride the controversial opinions of Ms Hanson. And as 
others have noted "it seems impossible to believe that an ordinary person 
listening to the song would seriously conclude that Pauline Hanson was a 
male homosexual, who enjoys paedophilia and anal sex"33 "it is all to 
ridiculous for words". 34 
What's more the reference by the court to the song as being nothing more 
than an attempt at "cheap denigration" perhaps indicates the problem that 
whether material is found to be defamatory may depend upon whether 
judges find it to be amusing or not. A factor that could prove to be costly 
for those whose humour is outside the boundaries of the taste of the white 
upper-middle class. 
Jssacks, Keith and Hanson illustrate the potential danger and uncertainty 
which artists and editors currently face in deciding whether to include an 
element of humour in their work, under the current legal regime. Courts 
seem to be either unwilling, or unable to recognise that the people are 
capable of understanding forms of humour such as satire, resulting in a 
misapplication of the reasonable person test. 
B Defences 
The second half of any defamation action 1s m deciding whether any 
workable defences are available to the action, as Simpson J recognised in 
Macquaire Bank v Berg "it may often be relatively easy to establish, 
prima facie that a publication is defamatory, and thus the key to a 
defamation action, may lie in the defences advanced". 35 However the 
currently recognised defences are not particularly well suited to the 
protection of humour. 
33 Roger Magnusson "Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: Ridicule, Satire and Other 
Challenges" (2001) 9 TLJ LEXIS 9, 36. 
34 Richard Ackland "Decision for Hanson has Disturbing Effect" (2 October 1998) The Sydney 
Morning Herald Sydney 23. 
35 Macquaire Bank v Berg [1999] A DefR 44,793, 53,035 per Simpson J. 
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1. Privilege 
A defence of privilege makes a person immune from defamation 
proceedings unless they have been shown to have been motivated by ill 
will or malice. Privilege attaches to a publication when the person who 
makes the communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or moral, 
to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is 
made has a corresponding interest of duty to receive it. 36 To obtain this 
defence there has to be some sort specific public interest in the material 
and general publication of material by the media is seldom covered by this 
defence. 37 
For humour this has a number of consequences, firstly unless the 
commentary is on an area that has been covered by privilege previously 
no defence will be available. In Truth (NZ) Ltd v Hollowa/8 the Court of 
Appeal stated that the media had two main functions; on the one hand it 
had the role of publishing reports on various types of proceedings and the 
other to provide its readers with news and even gossip concerning current 
events and people, while privilege may be accorded to the first function it 
will not arise in the latter. It is submitted that humour is more likely to be 
found to be analogous with the latter category and will seldom achieve 
protection under this defence. 
Furthermore even when humour attaches to a protected category, the 
defence may not be capable of giving it protection. For example 
commentary on political figures in their public role has been accepted as 
an area to which privilege can attach, however satire or parody often may 
distort or lampoon aspects of a political public figure but in doing so may 
also comment on their private life and thus make the comment fall outside 
the boundaries of privilege.39 In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v 
36 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309, 334 per Lord Atkinson. 
37 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 per Richardson P. 
38 Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway [1960] NZLR 69 (CA) per Gresson P. 
39 It was noted in Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, 390 that commentary of political figures does 
not extend into commentary on private life . 
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Hanson40 for example the defence of qualified privilege would fail 
because the comment related to matters seemingly of a personal nature, 
however on closer reflection it can be seen that the literal sexual 
references were in fact intended as an ironic statement relating to Ms 
Hanson's controversial political views and policy statements. 
Finally, it was noted in Lange that it was doubtful whether one-line 
references and throwaway comments would be protected by the defence 
of qualified privilege. 41 While this doesn't affect more considered pieces 
of satire (such as political cartoons) it could mean that a one-line zinger or 
a clever turn of phrase, even on a political figure in relation to their 
performance of their public duty, may not be capable of protection. 
2. Truth 
If a defendant can establish that the statement alleged to be defamatory is 
true, then he or she has a complete defence to a defamation action. The 
humour in most situations however, comes from the exaggeration of 
factual events or the false or twisted meanings given to words stated, and 
although the defence does not require 100 percent accuracy the remarks 
made have to be substantially true42 (i.e. not materially different form the 
truth) and this defence will almost without exception be unavailable to 
satirists. 
3. Honest Opinion 
Honest opinion grants an individual the right to express their opinion on 
40 Australian Broadcasting Cotporation v Hanson (Qld CA, 28 September 1998) BC9805224. 
41 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, 391 per Richardson P. 
42 Defamation Act I 992 (NZ), s 8(3)(a) requires the statement to be true or not materially different 
from the truth. 
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any matter43 so long as that opinion is honestly held and the speaker got 
their basic facts right, it is does not matter how unusual or damaging the 
opinion may be.44 
Honest opinion 1s the defence that is regarded as being the most 
appropriate for humorous commentary cases,45 however a number of 
technicalities required to be satisfied often makes it less applicable than 
previously assumed. 
Firstly, the opm1on must be an opm1on and not a statement of fact. 
Humorous commentary will often fall foul of this requirement due to the 
intermingling of fact with the satire. Furthermore most forms of humour 
involve hyperbolic exaggeration which does not lend itself well to an 
honest opinion defence, as it has been held that "the legal defence of fair 
comment will very rarely protect [sensationalist] defamatory 
matter. .. because of the impossibility of achieving sensations and still 
effecting a clear separation of the facts from the opinion".46 
Secondly the facts upon which the commentator relies must be true, 
although the remarks will be based upon some reality, the nature of satire 
is such that it can only be effective and funny if it is possible to make the 
stance or opinions of its target appear ridiculous. This desired effect often 
cannot be achieved without the recourse to some literalistic licence to 
magnify and exaggerate events or to include events, which did not in fact 
occur. For example in Keith47 to increase the satirical effect of the 
segment, the writers included the idea of beamish teeth receiving 
monetary kickbacks from the purchase. Furthermore, even when it may be 
possible, proving that the facts upon which the humour is based are true 
may prove difficult. Take for example the following jokes from recent 
opening monologues on the Jay Leno show: 
43 At common law the matter was restricted to one of public interest but this requirement has seemingly 
been abolished by the Defamation Act 1992. 
44 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 64. 
45John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media la w in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 15 . 
46 Smith Newspapers Ltd v Becker ( 1932) 47 CLR 279, 303 per Evatt J. 
47 Keith v TVNZ (December 1992) High Court Auckland CP780/91 , 8 Robertson J. 
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"Did you hear that Britney Spears was driving to Disneyland at the 
weekend. After driving for four hours she finally saw a sign that said 
'Disney Land, Left' so she turned around and went home" 
"Apparently Sony Playstation 2 are coming out with a new Britney Spears 
video game. Its very realistic, in fact the chips are made from the same 
silicone as Britney" 
The jokes are obviously comments upon Britney's intelligence level (the 
idea being that it is not very high) and the insinuation that she has had 
breast augmentation. Although its unlikely that Britney would consider 
suing over these jokes (not wanting to seem to self-important) if she did 
decide to sue, proving in court the facts upon which the jokes are based 
would be rather difficult, despite all the possible evidence which may 
seemingly support such statements. 
Finally as discussed above the nature of much satire involves a significant 
deal of exaggeration, such over the top statements may be viewed as 
falling outside the realms of opinions which the person could reasonably 
said to have held. 
C Damage to Reputation 
A defamation action will not succeed if there is no damage to a person 's 
reputation, as without this the remark cannot truly be said to be 
defamatory. In keeping with the spirit of other facets of defamation, 
reputation is a nebulous concept difficult to succinctly define. However 
one of the better attempts states that "reputation means an attitude of 
minds so that a mass of opinions go to make up the reputation which has 
been acquired by the person to whom the individual opinions relate .. .it is 
for damage to this that a person can sue and not for damage to a person's 
1, d' '' ,,4g persona 1ty or 1spos1t10n . 
48 Plato Films Ltd v Spiedel [ 1961] AC 1090, 1138 per Lord Denning. 
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The traditional approach to damage in defamation law is not well suited to 
dealing with comments involving humour. Defamation arising from 
ridicule is conceptually different from other bases of defamation. 
Although being satirised may involve having ones feelings hurt, it doesn't 
automatically follow that it will result in a loss of esteem in the eyes of 
others, as Millet LJ, discerned "it is one thing to ridicule a man; it is 
another to expose him to ridicule".49 If the damage requirement is applied 
too leniently50 then "the ridicule test becomes a vehicle for remedy to 
harm to the plaintiffs self-image or sense of self worth, as distinct form 
the plaintiffs standing in the eyes of others". 51 
One commentator has even gone so far as to suggest that "the ridicule part 
of the 'hatred, contempt or ridicule' test ... [has] been pressed into service 
in order to compensate plaintiffs who have suffered no disparagement and 
hence no injury to their reputations".52 The rationale behind this statement 
can be seen by consideration of the decision, of the English Court of 
Appeal, in Berkoff v Burchill.53 
The complaint arose from the publication of two unflattering references to 
the plaintiff in articles written for the Sunday Times by Miss Burchill. The 
offending excerpts being as follows: 
" ... film directors from Hitchcock to Berkoff, are notoriously hideous 
looking people ... " 
"The creature is made as a vessel for Waldman 's brain, and rejected in 
disgust when it comes out scarred and primeval. It 's a new look for the 
Creature - no bolts in the neck or flat-top hairdo - and I think it works; 
it ·s a lot like Stephen Berkoff, only marginally better looking" 
49 Berkoffv Burchill [1996] All ER 1008, 1020 per Lord Millet (dissenting). 
50 Which it arguably has been in many cases, especially given the courts tendency to exercise great 
caution before concluding that words are incapable of a being defamatory. 
51 Roger Magnusson "Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: Ridicule, Satire and Other 
Challenges" (200 I) 9 TLJ LEXIS 9, 27. 
52 Sally Walker Media Law: Commentary and Materials (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000) 137. 
53 Berkoffv Burchill [1996] All ER 1008. 
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The majority upheld the complaint, finding that calling a person 
(especially one who made his living in part as an actor) 'hideously ugly' 
could be defamatory, since it was capable of lowering his standing in the 
estimation of the public and of making him an object of ridicule. It was 
therefore a remark for which the plaintiff deserved to be compensated. 
However not all members of the court were convinced, Lord Justice 
Millett was of the opinion that the proceedings were as frivolous as the 
articles complained of stating "How then can the words complained of 
injure Mr Berkoff s reputation? They are an attack on his appearance and 
not on his reputation" and "I have no doubt that the words complained of 
were intended to ridicule Mr Berkoff, but I do not think they made him 
look ridiculous or lowered his reputation in the eyes of ordinary people". 54 
The case of McRae v Australian Consolidated Press55 illustrates that when 
damages are given, the amount awarded is often extremely high and 
arguably out of proportion to the damage suffered by the humorous attack. 
In this case the plaintiff, herself a notorious gossip, successfully sued and 
was awarded damages of $375,000, for the publication of a statement56 in 
"Metro" magazine that McRae alleged, implied that she was regularly 
drunk. 
While one could perhaps understand such a verdict if the statement had 
been published in a Metro article of a serious nature, it was in fact 
published as part of the Felicity Ferret column, a column known for its 
satirical commentary on famous personalities and socialites. As Shelia 
McCabe, counsel for the defendants, noted "it is a column which readers 
54 Berkojfv Burchill (1996] All ER 1008, 1020. 
55 McRae v Australian Consolidated Press (27 April 1994) High Court Auckland CP 1161/92 
Tompkins J. 
56 The statement noted that the plaintiff was seen to be "regularly pissed" which was followed by the 
comment "surely regularly pssst? - Ed", and was thus a play on words of the title of Ms McRae's 
gossip column PSSST. 
take with a very large pinch of salt" and "is not regarded as a document of 
truth". 57 
The words were obviously play on words of the title of Ms McRae's 
gossip column and given the satirical nature of the statement, the context 
of the publication, it is submitted that no damages let alone such an 
excessive amount should have been awarded. Damages being awarded in 
cases like these have the ability to stifle the publication of a large amount 
of humorous material, as very few publishers would want to risk their 
publication being subject to a similar fate. 58 
III NEED FOR REFORM: CHANGING SOCIETAL 
ATTITUDES 
The ability and right to express oneself freely and openly is a concept, 
which has received increasing acceptance and importance both locally and 
internationally. It is a concept that has been enshrined in international 
law59 and is the cornerstone of the constitution of many countries of the 
world, including New Zealand.60 The right to free speech is expressly 
provided for in section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1992. It provides: 
Freedom of Expression - Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and opinions of any kind in any form ( emphasis added). 
While the section itself provides for a seemingly broad coverage of free 
expression, the right to free speech guaranteed by the Act is not unlimited. 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act permits for constraints to be imposed 
57 "FeITet Decision Surprises Expert on Libel" (29 April 1994) The New Zealand Herald Auck.land, 9. 
58 The chilling effect this decision has was noted by Canterbury Journalism Lecturer, Jim Tully in 
"Gossip Columnists Slug it Out" (22 April 1994) National Business Review Auckland, 12. 
59 For example see Article 19 of both the International Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . 
60 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper ( 1985) described freedom of expression as being 
of central importance in a democratic state. 
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upon any of the freedoms, so long as the constraint is one, which is " a 
reasonable limitation prescribed by law and can be demonstrably 
justifiable in a free and democratic society". 
It should be noted that there still exists some controversy over whether the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 applies to private law, such as defamation at all. 
Although this matter is far from settled, even those commentators who 
oppose the idea have conceded that in appropriate cases, the common law 
is affected by public interests reflected in the Bill of Rights. 61 Defamation 
would seem to be an area where such an indulgence is appropriate. As 
Elias J noted "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is important 
contemporary legislation which is directly relevant to the policies served 
by the common law of defamation". 62 
In determining whether a constraint is one that is permissible pursuant to 
section 5, one must first determine whether the limitation is one that is 
prescribed by law (i.e. that it is ascertainable and intelligible). 63 It is 
arguable that the inconsistency in rulings, which deal with the liability of 
humorous commentary, means that the current limitation is not 
sufficiently certain so as to be prescribed by law. 64 
More important however is whether the current regulation and limitation 
placed upon humorous commentary 1s demonstrably justified. 
Unfortunately rights such as freedom of expression are not amendable to 
the creation of a fonnulaic test,65 but it can be detected that what is 
essentially required is that the limitation be a rationale and proportionate 
61 Compare Rishworth's comments in "The Potential of the Bill ofR.ight" l [1990] ZLJ, 70 and the 
above concession in Huscroft, Optican and Rish worth "The Bill of Rights - getting the basics right" 
(NZLS Seminar, Wellington, November 2001). 
62 Lange vAtkinson [1997] 2 NZLR22, 32 (HC) . 
63 Huscroft, Optican and Rishworth "The Bill of Rights - getting the basics right" (NZLS Seminar, 
Wellington, November 2001). 
64 However it is not possible in an essay of this size to discuss this point in detail. 
65 Huscroft, Optican and Rishworth "The Bill of Rights - getting the basics right" (NZLS Seminar 
ovember 2001). 
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response to its intended objective.66 Whether the current limitation and 
regulation of humorous commentary is justified is subsequently analysed 
through the evaluation of both the detriments and benefits of humour and 
through consideration of whether the damage that such statements may 
cause, is nevertheless outweighed by the importance of permitting 
unfettered humorous commentary. 
A Detrimental Effect of Humour 
A century ago a person who had mastered the art of ridicule could 
potentially strip a man of their social standing and associated reputation 
with one carefully turned phrase. Humour against ones enemies or 
brethren was regarded as perhaps the most potent weapon against a public 
man. 67 The famous French philosopher Voltaire has in fact been quoted as 
saying "I have made but one prayer to God; please Lord make my 
enemies look ridiculous".68 
The perceived power behind ridicule led to the desire to protect people's 
reputation from unjustifiable attack, with rather severe penalties being 
handed out for those who sought to besmirch reputations humorously. In 
1831 cartoonist Philipon was charged with defamation of King Louis-
Phillipe, after Philipon had drawn a cartoon depicting him as a pear "La 
Poire" which as that time in France also stood for fool. Philipon was 
found guilty and subsequently sentenced to 6 months imprisonment. 
However one of the essential elements of defamation is that it acts as a 
living doctrine and consequently what is and what is not defamatory 
changes with time and place so as "to reflect the changing needs of 
society to which it applies" . 69 It is my submission that it is possible that 
todays society places a different value upon ridicule and humorous 
66 For further discuss ion of thi s point see, R v Oakes [ 1986] 15 CR l 03 ; Moonen v Film and Literature 
Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9. 
67 Odger v Mortimer (1873) 28 LT 472,473 per Bovil CJ. 
68 M Giloo ly The Law of Defamation in Australia and New Zealand (Federati on Press, Sydney, 1998) 28. 
69 Lange v Atkinson [ 1997] 2 NZLR 22, 32 (HC) per Elias J. 
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comment and that we have moved to a point where ridicule no longer hjas 
the extent of damaging power it once had. In fact it may be questionable 
whether in today's society being ridiculed is capable of causing harm to a 
person's public image at all. 
Humour abounds in all formats of media from television shows such as 
The Late Show with David Letterman, right through to more traditional 
formats such as newspaper columnists and cartoonists like Tom Scott. 
Society (at least the Australasian society) it would seem has developed an 
entirely new and legitimate form of ridicule, which has been colloquially 
described as "the art of taking the piss". 70 
It has been accepted that it is possible for words and phrases, which 
although once may have had previous hurtful and damaging connotations, 
may often be disempowered through their absorption into common 
usage. 71 It is thus tenable that the power of ridicule has been 
correspondingly minimised through the common convention that it has 
obtained. These days people ( especially public figures against whom the 
majority of ridicule is inflicted) genuinely expect some form of humorous 
slating if they are unfortunate enough to make an erroneous decision or 
hold a controversial opinion. The time has perhaps come when we can 
honestly say as a society we have learned to take a joke. 
This is not to say that anyone really enjoys being the subject of humorous 
commentary, and commentators do argue that despite its jovial intention 
humour can be equally as damaging as a mean spirited attack. That to call 
someone hurtful names or to insinuate that they have been guilty of 
immoral actions, even in jest can be damaging to ones reputation as 
70 Walkley Magazine Online "The Art of Taking the Piss" <http: //magazine.walkleys.com> (last 
accessed 26 August 2003). 
71 For further discussion of this idea see writings that relate to the disempowering of hate speech such 
as Judith Butler Excitable Speech (Routledge, ew York, 1997). 
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people internalise and attribute the humorous comment to that person as 
one of fact. 72 
Others argue that satire et al, have only a minimal and fleeting effect on 
the shared view that the public holds of a person 73 , and that fundamentally 
the only people who seem to take a negative view of the plaintiff, because 
of a humorous statement are those who already held such an opinion, the 
comment acting simply as personal affirmation of that belief.74 
Furthermore those people who can be seen to take a joke are often raised 
in the estimation of others. 
Unfortunately during my research it became obvious that there was a real 
lack of statistical or factual evidence on this point, most commentators 
relying on personal feelings and logical assertions. The one study of some 
relevance 75 to this argument was "The Late Night Effect" by Mark Phillip 
Fernando. 76 Through his research Fernando attempted to evaluate and 
analyse the effect humorous late night variety shows, such as The Late 
Show with David Letternrnn, The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Saturday 
Night Live, had on peoples perceptions of public figures (in particular 
political personalities). 
Through survey and focus group research Fernando found that the effect 
that satire and other forms of humour utilised by the shows, has a varying 
effect on individuals attitudes towards the target depending upon various 
personal factors. Perhaps the key findings of his research can be 
summarised as being: 
72 See the comments of Paul Holmes in relation to the McRae case in "Gossip Columnists Slug it Out" 
(22 April 1994) National Business Review Auckland, 12. 
73 Roger Magnusson "Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: Ridicule, Satire and Other 
Challenges" (2001) 9 TLJ LEXIS 9, 29. 
74 Duncan Lamont "Let the Judges do the Jokes" (9 June 2003) The Guardian London. 
75 This study is only of partial value to this topic, as firstly the participants in the research where 
American citizens who possibly have differing values to those of the ordinary New Zealander, and 
more importantly the survey sample sizes were relatively small, and the need for more comprehensive 
and extensive research in this area was noted by the author. Additionally the research was solely based 
upon one type of humour and its effect on political figures. 
7 Mark Fernando "The Late Night Effect" Thesis submitted for Degree of Arts Masters, Georgetown 
University available online at <http ://cct.georgetown.edu/thesis/MarkFernando.pdt> (last accessed 26 
August 2003). 
• Youth (i.e. those 18-25) were more likely to be influenced by 
the humour, however this result was also due in part to this 
groups lack of political interest and ignorance other sources of 
information. 
• Influence was more noticeable m those without or with low 
levels of education. 
• Conversely the influence of humour was negligible in relation 
to those with higher educations. 
From this study it can be contended that for those who are older, more 
educated and more interested in public events, humour is not a significant 
operational factor in the esteem in which they hold others. However for 
those who are younger, less educated and who have little interest in 
current events the effect was significant. For the purposes of defamation it 
is the view of the reasonable person which is important, where this person 
resides among this spectrum of situations is somewhat of a subjective 
judgment, however it is my belief that one should look towards the higher 
end of the scale, preferring to risk the creation of a more literate and 
intelligent reasonable person than to risk putting the threshold to low. 
The temporal effect of humour not being evaluated, it is my submission 
that humour does not have a strong effect upon the reputation of those 
who are the subject of such an attack. It is conceded however, that there 
may be rare instances where there occurs an overbearing amount of 
ridicule, where comments have obtained a parasitic connection with the 
plaintiff. 77 In these situations where the statement has caused the plaintiff 
to constantly remain a "preposterously ridiculous spectacle"78 could it 
properly be said that they have genuinely lost standing in the eyes of 
others and consequently be entitled to some fonn of redress. However this 
situation can still be protected without the need to have recourse to a 
77 Roger Magnusson "Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: Ridicule, Satire and Other 
Challenges" (2001) 9 TLJ LEXIS 9, 29. 
78 Burton v Crowell Publishing Co (1936) 82 F.2d 154, 155. 
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ridicule based test, for once a statement has obtained such notoriety it is in 
reality no longer one of humour but one of contempt. This approach is 
advantageous as it ensures that the rare cases of actionable defamation 
based upon a humorous comment can be protected while preventing the 
current situation where lesser, non-deserving claims are unpredictably 
permitted to succeed. 
B Beneficial Aspects of Humour 
Humour (in particular satire) has been lauded on a number of occasions 
because of the beneficial aspects that it brings to the reporting and 
discussion of current events, in fact it has been said that "To those slightly 
more liberal (and intelligent), the importance of [humorous] commentary 
which causes a society to examine itself critically and confront its 
deficiencies is self-evident" . 79 
Wilkinson J, has noted that "satire is particularly relevant to political 
debate because it tears down facades , deflates stuffed shirts and unmasks 
hypocrisy. By cutting through the constraints imposed by pomp and 
ceremony it is a form of irreverence as welcome as fresh air"80 and further 
on that "Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high and 
mighty lampooned and spoofed" .81 
The power of humour lies in its ability to tackle an issue from a different 
angle or present an argument in a distinctive light in such a way that the 
audience ' s perceptions are challenged or expanded to include arguments 
they had previously not considered. By holding a person or particular 
issue up to ridicule, society is able to think more critically about itself and 
may be able to similarly analyse subsequent situations later on . 
79 Tony Fitzgerald J "Telling the Truth , Laughing" ( 13 November 1998) Communications Update 
Sydney 11 , 14. 
8° Falwell v Flynt 805 F.2d 484, 487 per Wilkinson J. 
81 Falwell v Flynt 805 F .2d 484, 487 per Wilkinson J. 
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Additionally humour has the power to reach a greater audience than that 
of traditional straight reporting, a significantly large section of society 
enjoys comedy and are therefore more likely to read about an issue they 
may otherwise have avoided if it had not been presented in a humorous or 
creative way82 . This point was illustrated in Issaks, when explaining her 
intentions behind the article, the author, Rose Farley, noted it was 
constructed in the way it was so that readers would be attracted to it and 
appreciate the satire, thus effecting a critique on the previous decision 
without overly emotive journalism.83 Humour can effectively lighten the 
load of a serious topic and make it more palatable to the audience. 84 
Alternatively the failure to protect humour could have the potential to 
result in a chilling of humorous discussion and of satirical forms of 
publication. In a study on the chilling effect of defamation law on various 
forms of media, it was observed that in all forms of media (but in 
particular regional newspapers, magazine and book publishers) the 
potential of a defamation action was an influential factor in deciding 
whether material would be published. 85 
Although it is acknowledged that there is currently no real perceptible 
lack of humour and most victims of satirical attack tend to avoid litigation 
in the hope that the embarrassing remarks will blow over, decisions such 
as those in Keith, 86 Burchill, 87 Hanson,88 have the ability to create a 
precedent of limited allowance for humour. 
Until some method of reform is enacted there will continue to be 
uncertainty about when a joke or humorous statement may result in the 
82 Walkley Magazine Online "The Art of Taking th e Piss" <http: //magazine.walkleys.com> (last 
accessed 26 August 2003). 
83 New Tim es Inc (Dallas Observer) v Bruce lssacks and Darlene Whit/en (2002) 91 SW 3d 844, 857 (Tex App). 
84 Mark Fernando "The Late Night Effect " Thesis submitted for Degree of Arts Masters, Georgetown 
University available online at <http: //cct.georgetown.edu/thesis/MarkFernando.pdt> (last accessed 26 
August 2003). 
85 Burton v Crowell Publishing Co (1936) 82 F.2d 154, 155. 
86 Keith v TVNZ (December 1992) High Court Auckland CP780/91, Robertson J. 
87 Berko./Jv Burchill [1996] All ER 1008. 
88 Australian Broadcasling Corporation v Hanson (28 September 1998) Queensland Court of Appeal BC9805224. 
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exposure to a costly defamation suit. Leaving the law in this lottery-like 
state has the potential to remove more acerbic forms of expression in 
favour of more polite discussion only as publishers may who are in doubt 
err on the side of caution and strike the problematic material out. 89 For 
why would anyone risk making a joke when the consequences of a 
defamation action are so high?90 
In my op1111on, as the potential detriment caused by humorous 
commentary is no longer as severe as it once was and given the submitted 
benefits of such discourse, restraint on its use through defamation actions 
is no longer a limitation that is demonstrably justified. 
IV REFORM 
Although the law has had to deal with only a relatively small number of 
satirical defamation cases, the proceeding discussion highlights the fact 
that the law in its present state is clumsy and ill-equipped to satisfactorily 
handle them when they do arise. Clear and certain safeguards are needed 
to provide protection for and prevent self-censorship of a valuable method 
of discourse. 
This section looks at the way in which an appropriate adjustment could be 
achieved. Rather than purporting to be a definitive answer, the following 
should instead be regarded as a basis for further and more comprehensive 
investigation. 
A Type of Reform 
The first aspect that needs to be decided upon is whether change is to be 
made through legislative intervention and statutory amendment, or 
89 Eric Barendt, et al Libel and the Media : The Chilling Effect, (I 997, Clarendon Press, Oxford) 191. 
90 G Huscroft &P Rish worth "Rights and Freedoms: The ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act I 990 and The 
Human Rights Act 1993" (Brookers, Wellington, 1995). 
26 
through judicial reformulation of the common law. While the latter 
obviously allows for more flexibility, the case law previously canvassed 
illustrates that it may not be possible to rely on the judiciary for 
consistent, and m some instances fair, treatment of humorous 
commentary. 
Additionally, although parallels can be drawn with the creation of the 
political privilege defence in Lange,9' the alteration in this instance, while 
still only in relation to a relatively small section of the law, nonetheless 
represents a more extensive development of the law and is not simply a 
refinement in the application of existing law. 
It is my submission that it would be more practicable to instead create a 
specific defence for cases of humorous commentary, which would make 
such statements immune from defamation litigation. The main benefits 
being that the defence could be tailored to cover only those statements 
deemed worthy of protection, providing an appropriate balance between 
the need to protect reputations and giving proper consideration to free 
speech and the benefits of satire. And that the creation of an express 
coherent rule reduces the potential for continued judicial inconsistency. 
The drawback however, is that legislative reform can be notoriously slow, 
especially in relation to defamation law. The difficulty being that 
politicians are unlikely to push for a change which favours defendants, 
when they are collectively the most likely group of potential plaintiffs. 92 
B Scope of Reform 
As with all defences, it will need to be ensured that in permitting humour 
to be a protected form speech, the protection granted goes no further than 
is necessary and that a general 'just kidding' defence is not created. Such 
91 Lange v Atkinson [ l 998) 3 NZLR 424; Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 . 
92 As noted by Former Prime Minister David Lange in "Defamation Reform in Media and Advertising 
Law" (Legal Research Foundation Seminar, l 992). 
a defence would unjustifiably allow unworthy defendants the opportunity 
to take advantage of a sophisticated literary concept to excuse a mean 
spirited and damaging attack. 93 
An example of this problem can be illustrated by a recent event in the 
United States, where a fraternity sought to invoke the 'just kidding' 
defence where it was arguably not suitable. 94 The Zeta Psi fraternity was 
known for publishing a periodical newspaper in which exploits of its 
brothers was discussed and reported, however in one edition the fraternity 
published a number of unsavoury comments about female students 
including the suggested size of personal anatomy and disparaging 
comments about their sexual promiscuity. While the case did not proceed 
to a defamation trial the chapter was derecognised by the university due to 
the potential liability it could face. The fraternity's defence to this 
situation, "it was satirical" and "we were only joking". 
To be a workable and valuable addition to the law of defamation, a 
defence based upon humour needs to be clearly defined and drafted so as 
to allow the courts to distinguish authentic defendants from those who are 
undeceiving of this protection. In developing a standard for identifying 
protectable material, some consideration of the defence of honest opinion 
could be of value. For while that defence covers a broad range of 
statements and viewpoints, it also requires them to be genuinely held 
before granting them immunity from litigation. 
It is therefore submitted that an aspect of genuineness should be required 
for a defence based upon humour. In this respect regard should be had to 
three main elements - the author, the reader and the text itself - which 
when combined give a complete and authentic meaning to the statement 
published. The defence should be drafted in such a way so as to allow the 
courts to consider these factors in order to answer the following questions; 
93 Lana Whitehead "Harassment? Just Kidding " <www.roanoke.com> (last accessed 24 August 2003). 
94 For a more comprehensive discussion of the event sec Lana Whitehead "Harassment? Just Kidding " 
<www.roanoke.com> (last accessed 24 August 2003). 
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firstly was there a genuine attempt at humour? and secondly can it be 
recognised as such? 
1. Authorial Intent 
In some respects giving consideration to the intent of the author represents 
a major departure from traditional defamation law, as it has generally been 
accepted that this intention is irrelevant. 95 However strict adherence to this 
principle has been somewhat reduced by the recognition that intention 
may be relevant when it is so obvious as to colour the meaning of the 
words. 96 It is submitted that the intention should be considered for those 
cases where humour is involved, for it has been established that the 
readers interpretation of material is based in part upon the meaning the 
author is trying to convey. 97 
It is by no means suggested that this aspect should be decisive, but simply 
that before going any further in determining whether the defence applies it 
is necessary to distinguish between cases where there has been a genuine 
intent to satirise, or lampoon and those where the statement was nothing 
but malicious invective. As with the defence of honest opinion a simple 
assertion of intent will not suffice, there must be some evidence that 
supports the claim. 
2. Textual Analysis 
Under this facet, courts should firstly examine the circumstances of the 
publication, with contextual factors, such as the presence of any 
disclaimers, the publication of the material within a renowned satirical 
magazine or television programme being strong factors in favour of the 
defendants case for protection. 
95 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234. 
96 Berkoffv Burchill [1996] All ER 1008. 
97 Leslie Treiger "Protecting Satire form Libel Claims: A new reading of the First Amendments 
Opinion Privilege" (1989) 98 Yale L.J. 1215, 1230. 
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When no obvious contextual clues are present the court should then look 
at the actual text and words used to examine whether any element of 
humour is present, i.e. does the piece lampoon political views, or present a 
criticism of a societal flaw in a farcical way? In undertaking this 
assessment the court should not be concerned with the merits of the 
humour, or whether they think it was funny and instead look to see 
whether there is any evidence that would support a claim for protection. 
Finally, as Leslie Treiger notes: "courts should be careful not to look to 
the facial, seemingly factual message of a satiric piece, but instead focus 
on its underlying point". 98 
3. The Reader's Interpretation 
This aspect has been traditionally the factor with which the courts 
determined the liability arising from humorous commentary, focusing on 
whether the statement was an outrageous, implausible exaggeration or 
instead a believable description of actual events or imputation of facts. 
This aspect is undoubtedly an important consideration and it is 
recommended that it be retained, but with a number of applicational 
changes. 
Firstly the hypothetical audience should be reduced from the general 
public, to the ordinary readers of views of the material in question. This 
reduces the potential for surprise reactions to an authors work, as they 
should have fairly competent idea of what type of humour their readers or 
viewers would be able to understand and what meanings they would likely 
attach to words spoken or written and thus decide whether to publish it or 
not99 . In doing so Judges will need to be open to all sorts of humour and 
tastes. Thus what was seen by the judges in Hanson' 00 as nothing but 
98 Leslie Treiger "Protecting Satire form Libel Claims: A new reading of the First Amendments 
Opinion Privilege" ( 1989) 98 Yale L.J. 1215, 1231 . 
99 Of course the joke may reach others outside this target audience but unless the plaintiff can establish 
that there was a substantial amount of "outsiders" who heard the statement their reaction will not need 
to be evaluated. 
100 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Hanson (28 September 1998) Queensland Court of Appeal 
BC9805224. 
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cheap denigration was likely a very humorous piece for the young 
audience of the Triple J radio station. 
Finally I believe the court needs to give greater recognition to the ability 
of the reasonable person to discern when something is only meant in jest. 
It may be argued that raising the current bar pushes the defence too far in 
favour of defendants and is representative of an idealist rather than realist 
society. However it is my belief that a greater expectation of the 
reasonable person to "get the joke" is properly in accordance with the 
philosophy to use defamation law not only as a barometer but architect of 
social norms. 
V CONCLUSION 
Humour comes in may forms, satires, parodies, caricatures and so on, it 
provides society with a much needed relief from what can otherwise often 
be solemn and morose dialogue. We have perhaps been fortunate that so 
far, for a number of possible reasons, most figures that fall target to 
humorous commentary have refrained from suing. However as this paper 
has shown when a defamation action is persisted upon, the current state of 
the law means the outcome is far from certain. The Jaw of defamation 
needs to be amended so that humour, or at least genuine attempts at 
humour are protected. For as Magnusson contends "Are we really content 
with a society where lawful satire can never get beyond gentle gibes and 
friendly caricatures so that public figures feel loved at the end of the 
day?" 101 What would surely be a most undesirable result indeed. 
101 Roger Magnusson "Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law: Ridicule, Satire and Other 
Challenges" (2001) 9 TLJ LEXIS 9, 28. 
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